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Abstract
This paper introduces and compares the currently most important approaches to
frames: the FrameNet project pursued at the ‘International Computer Science In-
stitute’ in Berkeley and Barsalou’s cognitive frame theory supplemented by Löb-
ner’s concept type theory. On the basis of empirical Vndings of a case study on
associative anaphora, it is argued that both approaches complement each other
in several respects. While, for example, Barsalou’s theory concentrates on sortal
concepts, disregarding semantic and syntactic valences of each word in each of its
senses, FrameNet focuses on relational concepts, particularly verbs and deverbal
nouns. In contrast to frames as described in terms of valency patterns within
FrameNet, linguistic approaches drawing on Barsalou’s theory emphasize that
frames are embedded structures having a rich internal structure. By comparison,
serious shortcomings and drawbacks of each approach become apparent.
1 Introduction
The notion frame goes back to Minsky’s inWuential paper on knowledge repre-
sentation (Minsky, 1975), and since then it has been a central, but also ambiguous
and controversial, concept in many disciplines (for an overview cf. Ziem, 2008,
pp. 13-35), including cognitive semantics (e. g., Fillmore, 1976, 1977, 1985, 2006),
computational linguistics (Petersen, 2007/2015, among others), artiVcial intelli-
gence (e. g., Charniak, 1976; Hayes, 1980), cognitive psychology (e. g., Schank &
Abelson, 1977; Barsalou, 1992), and Media Sciences (Scheufele, 2003; Matthes,
2007). In spite of the vivid discussions in the 1980s, in current research the frame
concept seems to have become less attractive. However, there are two excep-
tions. On the one hand, Fillmore’s early account of semantic frames has been put
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
93
Alexander Ziem
into practice within FrameNet, a large-scale computational lexicography project
hosted at the University of Berkeley, California (for an overview cf. Boas, 2005;
Fillmore, Johnson & Petruck, 2003). Similarly, also Barsalou’s frame theory has
recently been readdressed and further developed, namely in the research projects
“Frames and functional concepts” (FOR 600) and “The Structure of Representa-
tions in Language, Cognition, and Science” (SFB 991), both hosted at the Univer-
sity of Düsseldorf.
The starting point of the present paper is the fact that both approaches seem
to be based on a mutually shared deVnition of frames. While FrameNet sees
frames as a “script-like conceptual structure that describes a particular type of
situation, object or event, along with its participants and props” (Ruppenhofer et
al., 2010, p. 5), Barsalou (1992, p. 21) proposes that “frames are dynamic structures
whose form is Wexible and context-dependent”. However, signiVcant diUerences
relate to the theoretical prerequisites of each approach. Barsalou’s frame model is
cognitive in nature; it addresses frames asmental entities. FrameNet, on the other
hand, is Vrst and foremost a linguistic approach to lexical meaning grounded in
the concept of semantic and syntactic valency. As a result, both approaches diUer
substantially in the way their methodology is put into practice.
Taking so-called associative anaphora (henceforth: AA) as a ‘test case’, this
paper aims at providing a theoretical and methodological comparison of the two
currently most sophisticated approaches to frames. An associative anaphor es-
tablishes indirect reference to a previously introduced discourse referent (e. g.,
key → car, cf. Ex. 1). Focusing on the resolution of indirect text reference, the
present paper addresses the following kinds of issues, among others: How does
FrameNet and a Barsalou-inspired approach to frames account for reference res-
olution in the case of AA? Do both approaches adequately describe and explain
the phenomenon addressed? And most importantly: Given the results of the
case study, what are the assets and drawbacks of each approach? Is it possible to
(partly) integrate both approaches in one another, yielding a more comprehensive
frame theory?
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I will brieWy introduce the
most important properties of associative anaphora. This section also provides
a preliminary typology of AAs, including deVnite associative anaphors with ei-
ther verbal or nominal antecedents as its most important subclasses. Section 3
sketches out Barsalou’s approach to frames and its extensions yielded in the re-
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search project FOR 600 insofar as it is relevant for applications to DAAs. Likewise,
Section 4 introduces the methodology oUered by FrameNet in order to investigate
DAAs. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and compares the results. Based on these
Vndings, it draws some conclusions pointing to promising perspectives for future
frame-semantic research.
2 The case of associative anaphora
Following the standard deVnition, an AA, sometimes also called “bridging ana-
phor” (Clark, 1975) or subsumed under “indirect anaphor” (Schwarz, 2000) is a
Vrst-mentioned use of a deVnite or indeVnite expression that establishes indirect
reference to a previously introduced discourse referent in a text (Löbner, 1998).
In (1), for example, the reader mentally creates a concept for the anaphoric NP the
key that includes information about the previously introduced discourse referent
car, yielding the more complex concept “Peter’s car key”. The possessor argu-
ment of key is saturated with conceptual information that the antecedent his car
provides.
(1) Peter walked to his car [antecedent]. He had forgotten the key [associa-
tive anaphor].
When a referential use of an NP prompts the reader to construe a concept for this
entity, the lexical frame is subsequently enriched by idiosyncratic information
either provided by the context or inferred from background knowledge. In the
context of (1), for example, the concept associated with key indirectly relates to
the NP his car. More speciVcally, the key is interpreted as the key of Peter’s
car. Note that associative anaphors have no deictic quality; in order to determine
the reference of the noun key, for example, a conceptual representation of the
respective referent is construed solely by means of information provided by the
discourse referent car and the AA. It is thus the linguistic and not the situational
context of the anaphorically used deVnite NP the key that helps to identify the
referent of the NP.
To gain a deeper understanding of forms and functions of AAs in texts, it is
useful to distinguish between diUerent types of AAs (for a typology based on
so-called “activation types” cf. Schwarz, 2000). First, a frequently found distin-
guishing criterion relates to deVniteness/indeVniteness of AAs.
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(2) They passed an old monastery. A window was smashed.
IndeVnite associative anaphors, such as exempliVed in (2), are exceptional; the
majority of AAs belong to the class of deVnite associative anaphors (henceforth:
DAAs). This class comprises four important subclasses, exempliVed in (3)-(6). As
the examples (3) and (4) indicate, antecedents of DAAs may be verbal or nominal.
Note that the class of DAAs with nominal antecedents comprise not only deverbal
nouns, like search in (4), which are inherently relational, but also sortal nouns, like
house in (5), which lack this feature (for the distinction of noun types cf. Horn
& Kimm, 2014, also: Löbner, 1998).
(3) Peter bought a new Mercedes. The price was lower than expected.
(4) The search lingers on, but the key remains lost.
(5) They reached Peter’s house. The window pane in the door had been
smashed.
Another distinguishing criterion concerns the kind of reference to be established
between AAs and their antecedents (Greber, 1993; Kleiber, 2001). Associative-
anaphoric reference may be direct or indirect. Indirect DAAs are characterized
by nominal DAAs whose referents are not indirectly anchored in the concept
associated with the antecedent but in a sub- or superordinate concept. In the case
of (6), for example, the associative anaphor the menu is not interpreted as the
waiter’s but as that of the restaurant in which the waiter is serving.
(6) The waiter came to our table. He had forgotten the menu.
In this view, DAAs with verbal antecedents also belong to the class of indirect
DAAs since they are indirectly anchored in a concept associated with the an-
tecedent’s concept. In (3), for example, the DAA the price is not the price of
buying but the purchase price of the product. Table 1 summarizes the subclasses
of AAs mentioned so far. In the following I will concentrate on DAAs as the
prototype of AAs.
In the case of DAA, it is the deVniteness of the NP that triggers a referential in-
terpretation of the NP. Discussing diUerent theories of deVniteness, Lyons (1999)
distinguishes between (a) the familiarity approach (exempliVed in Heim, 1982)
which assumes that the deVnite article exhibits familiarity to both speaker and
96
FrameNet, Barsalou Frames and the Case of Associative Anaphora
Table 1: Types of associative anaphora (AA)
Type of AA Example Referential properties of AA
Direct definite associative
anaphora
Peter walked to his car. He
had forgotten the key.
Relational, unique reference
of nominal antecedent
Direct indefinite associative
anaphora
Peter passed the house. Awin-
dow was smashed.
Relational, non-unique refer-
ence of nominal antecedent
Indirect definite associative
anaphora
1. with a nominal
antecedent
2. with a verbal
antecedent
The waiter came to our table.
He had forgotten the menu.
Marie left Berlin yesterday.
The train was late again.
Relational, unique ‘indirect’
reference(transitive verb)
hearer, and (b) the identiVability approach which hypothesizes that the deVnite
article indicates that the addressee is able to identify the referent on the basis of
given information. In either approach, the deVnite article in (1) gives rise to a
referential reading of key in such a way that it is interpreted as Peter’s car key.
Analogously, in (2) the DAA unambiguously denotes one particular concept that
serves as a semantic role of the verbal antecedent. This brief description of DAAs
suXces to test and compare in Section 2 FrameNet and Barsalou frames regarding
their descriptive adequacy.
Traditional approaches to AA suUer from three shortcomings. However, as
I will argue later, a frame theory that incorporates insights from both Barsa-
lou’s and FrameNet’s approach might be capable of overcoming these deVcits.
First, traditional approaches fail to explain the ‘felicity conditions’ required for
anaphoric-reference resolution. In his still inWuential approach, Hawkins (1978,
p. 107), for example, hypothesizes that frequent co-occurrences of the anaphoric
and antecedent expression license anaphoric reference. The frequency condition,
however, is not met in many attested examples of associative anaphors (Löbner,
1998, p. 10). Second, it is not clear how contextually ‘enriched’ anaphoric mean-
ings emerge. While Heim’s formal approach assumes an additional mechanism,
namely “accommodation” (Heim, 1982, p. 370), Schwarz (1996) postulates very
abstract semantic constraints. Still, it is anything but obvious how these semantic
constraints or accommodations may account for instances such as (1)-(6). Finally,
a principal problem lies in explicating the relations holding between anaphors and
their antecedents. The relations holding between DAAs and their antecedents
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seem to be less restricted than commonly assumed in literature. Within tradi-
tional frameworks (e. g., Greber, 1993, pp. 379-387; Kleiber, 2001, pp. 263-296),
it seems to be problematic to delimit the number of relations, and it is hard to
provide a precise and maximally exhaustive classiVcation without creating a po-
tentially unlimited number of relations. In the next sections, the application of
FrameNet and Barsalou frames aims at elucidating both the analytic assets and
drawbacks of each approach.
3 Investigating associative anaphora with Barsalou frames
3.1 Frames as recursive attribute-value-structures: Barsalou’s
approach and its extensions in FOR 600
In several papers the cognitive psychologist Lawrence W. Barsalou has outlined a
cognitive frame theory that tries to take account of empirical Vndings in the Veld
of cognitive and experimental psychology (Barsalou, 1992, 1993; Barsalou & Hale,
1993). In contrast to FrameNet, Barsalou’s approach is designed as a genuinely
cognitive theory aiming at a comprehensive account of human knowledge repre-
sentation. Thus, Barsalou’s primary objective is not to develop a semantic theory
but a psychologically realistic theory of knowledge representation, including se-
mantic representations as one component. Accordingly, Barsalou (1992, p. 21)
postulates that frames, deVned as recursive attribute value-structures, provide
“the fundamental representation of knowledge in human cognition”. He presents
arguments why his frame theory is explanatorily more adequate than traditional
feature list representations of categories. In terms of the application scope of
frames, however, it is striking that the great majority of instances discussed in
Barsalou (1992) (e. g., car, vacation, bird, mare, animal) are limited to nominal
sortal concepts.
Barsalou’s frame theory has been adapted, extended, and slightly modiVed
within a linguistic framework. Based on ideas developed in Löbner (1998) and
other papers addressing a theory of concept types (cf. Löbner 2011 for an over-
view), the research unit “Frames and Functional Concepts” (FOR 600) as well as
the research project “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition,
and Science” (SFB 991) aim at developing a semantic theory allowing for deep
lexical-semantic decomposition within a formal-logical framework. As a Vrst
step, a formal theory of frames based on Barsalou frames was developed (Pe-
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tersen, 2007/2015). Major advances concern the integration of nominal concept
types, including their interaction with determination. More speciVcally, Löbner’s
concept theory and Barsalou frame approach were integrated into one another
in such a way that frame attributes (in Barsalou’s sense) are essentially equated
with functional concepts. Hence, it is assumed that attributes are characterized
by two constitutive features: relationality and uniqueness of reference. Assum-
ing that each attribute denotes precisely one entity of the respective frame allows
for mathematical modeling and formalizations of frames. As we will see in the
following paragraph, this assumption is also highly relevant for explaining the
resolution of AAs.
3.2 Putting Barsalou frames into practice: DAAs with nominal
antecedents
In Section 2, it has become evident that a distinguishing feature of DAAs is
uniqueness of reference. That is, a DAA is always interpreted in such a way
that it unambiguously refers to precisely one entity which has indirectly been
introduced into the discourse. To come straight to the point: It is one of the ma-
jor merits of Barsalou’s approach to DAAs (extended by Löbner’s concept type
theory) to provide a comprehensive explanation of this property of DAAs.
It is argued that a DAA refers to the (value of an) attribute in the frame of the
antecedent in such a way that the DAA is construed as a functional concept. More
speciVcally, Löbner (1998) argues that deVnite associative anaphors equate with
functional concepts for which a possessor and a situational argument are speciVed
in context. And since functional concepts are equated with frame attributes, a
DAA is interpreted as an attribute of the frame evoked by its antecedent. To
illustrate, consider again (1) where the deVnite article gives rise to a referential
reading of key in such a way that it is interpreted as the key for Peter’s car.
(1) Peter walked to his car [antecedent]. He had forgotten the key [associa-
tive anaphor].
For instances such as (1) it is characteristic that the built-up concept is functional
because it meets the conditions of relationality and uniqueness of reference (for
an overview of concept types and their properties see Löbner 2011; cf. also Horn
& Kimm, 2014). Its indirect reference is unique in that the number of possible ref-
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erents is restricted to only one indirect referent, namely Peter’s car. The observa-
tion that DAAs correspond to attributes in the frame of the antecedent’s referent
provides an opportunity to gain insights in the composition of these frames. To
the extent that the respective attribute can be considered a necessary component
of the antecedent frame, one obtains information about meaning components of
the antecedent nouns.
According to this theory, the head noun of a deVnite associative-anaphoric NP
undergoes a type shift if its underlying lexical concept is not functional (for criti-
cal discussions of type shifts cf. Horn & Kimm, 2014). In example (1) a type shift
is not necessary since the underlying lexical concept of key is already functional:
there is prototypically one and only one key that belongs to a car. Compare, how-
ever, example (7), where window – the head noun of the associative-anaphoric
NP – is not functional but relational on the lexical level.
(7) They reached Peter’s house. The window pane in the door had been
smashed.
The underlying lexical concept of window is relational (and not functional) be-
cause a house usually has more than one window. The possible referents of win-
dow is thus not restricted to only one referent. In order to facilitate uniqueness of
reference, window is the object of a shift from a relational to a functional concept
with a possessor argument speciVed by the antecedent. Such conceptual shifts are
always necessary if the head noun of an NP surfacing as a DAA is non-functional
on the lexical level; only functional concepts allow for unique reference.
Moreover, a frame-theoretical account of DAAs based on Barsalou’s frame con-
ception and Löbner’s concept type theory correctly predicts the type of relation
holding between anaphors and antecedents, and it also provides substantial sug-
gestions how discourse referents in a text may be represented as Barsalou frames.
Since it is assumed that the DAA has a functional head by default, every possible
type of attribute in a frame representing the referent of the antecedent NP is also
a possible type of DAA. The types usually enumerated in literature, such as parts,
roles, contiguity relations, etc. (cf. Greber, 1993; Kleiber, 2001; Schwarz, 2000,
among others), are all subsumed under this methodology. This approach thus
abandons any thematic restrictions on DAAs and their underlying relation, with-
out having to rely on empirical corpus evidence, since the argument presented
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here is theoretical in nature. On the other hand, the approach is more restrictive
than traditional approaches in observing that the relation between the referent of
the antecedent and the DAA referent must in fact be a functional one (cf. Löbner,
1998, 2011).
According to Barsalou (1992), recursivity constitutes an essential property of
frames. The principle of recursivity also holds for a DAA in that it may be the pos-
sessor of another DAA, thereby forming a chain that represents relations between
discourse referents in a network structure (for details cf. Ziem, 2012). Hypothe-
sizing that DAA referents themselves are also represented in frames, the theory
models DAAs as direct conjunctions of antecedent frames and DAA frames. If
a DAA is the possessor of another DAA, frames are recursively linked to each
other, constituting a complex frame network of newly introduced discourse ref-
erents. This is the case in (8).
(8) It was late when John arrived at his brother’s house. The doorwas closed.
Last week, John had lost the key, but fortunately he had received a substi-
tute straight away.
In (8), door is interpreted as the door of the house mentioned before, while key
is conceptualized as the key for this door. Once associative-anaphoric references
are resolved, the construed concepts are ‘enriched’ by context information, yield-
ing the complex concepts “the door of John’s brother’s house” respectively “the
key for the door of John’s brother’s house”. Modeling such chains of DAAs in
frame networks could ultimately lead to a representation of correlated discourse
referents in one single frame.
To conclude, Barsalou’s frame theory supplemented with Löbner’s concept
type theory takes account of at least three basic properties of DAAs. By equating
a DAA with a functional concept surfacing as an attribute of the frame evoked
by the antecedent, the approach Vrst successfully explains the diUerence between
deVnite and indeVnite associative anaphors: the reference of DAAs, but not the
reference of IAAs, is unique in that it is directed to precisely one entity indirectly
introduced into the discourse world before. Second, it correctly predicts the re-
lations holding between a DAA and its antecedent(s). Instead of postulating an
arbitrary number of relation types, it is hypothesized that the number of DAAs
(attributes) associated with a frame is potentially unlimited. Finally, recursiv-
101
Alexander Ziem
ity, as a constitutive property of Barsalou frames, allows explanation of chained
associative-anaphoric references, that is, NPs serving as DAAs and antecedents
(for other DAAs) at the same time. However, a major shortcoming concerns the
limitation of the approach to DAAs with nominal antecedents. It is anything
but clear whether the approach can be successfully applied to DAAs with verbal
antecedents, simply because both Löbner’s concept type theory and Barsalou’s
frame theory are restricted to nominal frames. Currently, however, Robert Van
Valin and Rainer Osswald are developing a theory of verb meaning based on
Barsalou frames. In the long run, this theory might help to extend the application
scope of Barsalou frames in the realm of AAs.
4 Investigating associative anaphora within FrameNet
4.1 Frames as valency pattern: background to FrameNet
Frames, as deVned in FrameNet and Fillmore’s early seminal studies on semantic
frames (e. g., Fillmore, 1976, 1977, 1985), are rich conceptual knowledge struc-
tures underlying and motivating the meaning(s) of lexical items and phrasal units.
Building on this deVnition, the FrameNet project pursued at the International In-
stitute of Computer Science in Berkeley tries to develop an online lexical database
for English documenting the semantic and syntactic valences of a word in each
of its senses (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 5). It has been, and still is, one of the
major aims of FrameNet to put Fillmore’s early theoretical ideas about seman-
tic frames into practice by developing an annotation tool that allows for data-
driven, rather than introspective, lexical-semantic investigations. At the end, the
database is supposed to provide all semantic information required for adequately
understanding lexical and phrasal units in context (Fillmore, Wooters & Baker,
2001).
In FrameNet, the target units are so-called lexical units, that is, word-meaning
pairings. The starting point is the assumption that each word (in each of its
senses) evokes a frame providing a set of “frame elements” (FEs); each sense of
a polysemous word thus belongs to a diUerent frame (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010,
p. 5). FEs are equated with semantic and/or syntactic roles that a lexical unit
takes. A distinction is made between peripheral and core FEs – a distinction
that seems to be analogous to the argument-adjunct diUerentiation in valency
grammar. Unlike valency grammar, however, FEs are not limited in number since
102
FrameNet, Barsalou Frames and the Case of Associative Anaphora
they are identiVed – and subsequently deVned – “bottom-up”, that is, on the basis
of annotated sentences. It is hypothesized that frames are not isolated entities in
the language user’s mind. Rather, they are linked by a system of frame-to-frame-
relations with one another. Fillmore & Baker (2010, p. 330) list seven relations
falling into three groups: (a) generalization relations (“inheritance”, “perspective”,
“using”), (b) event structure relations (“subframes”, “precedes”), and (c) systematic
relations (“causative of”, “inchoative of”). I will come back to them later when
analyzing instances of DAAs.
Due to the valency-oriented view on word meaning, FrameNet primarily fo-
cuses on frames associated with verbs, relational nouns, and adjectives. Presently,
about 7,700 lexical units have been annotated on the basis of approximately
173,000 sentences. About 3,260 verb senses, 2,940 noun senses, and 1,440 ad-
jective senses have been identiVed. The exemplary investigations of associa-
tive anaphora in the next paragraph will build on these data, particularly on the
(sub-)frames fully annotated so far. Note, as mentioned before, that the methodol-
ogy oUered by FrameNet only allows for detailed investigations of those associa-
tive anaphors whose antecedents surface as verbs or relational nouns; in contrast
to Barsalou’s approach to frames, FrameNet does not focus on sortal nouns as
frame-evoking elements even though they are also addressed and covered in the
database.
4.2 Putting FrameNet frames into practice: DAAs with verbs and
deverbal nouns as antecedents
Although FrameNet’s main focus is on frame-semantic investigations of lexical
units within the limits of the sentences they are embedded in, in a couple of
papers and books it has been argued persuasively that frames play also a crucial
role in the domain of text semantics. Fillmore (1984), for example, takes the view
that text semantics, on a par with lexical semantics, constitute the most prominent
level of semantic investigations. In line with this view, Fillmore & Baker (2001)
illustrate that 16 frames provide semantic prerequisites for the understanding of
a small story about a criminal process. Thus, it is principally possible to apply the
FrameNet methodology to textual phenomena such as AAs.
How does a FrameNet approach to AA proceed? To begin with, consider (9)
where the referent of the deVnite noun phrase (NP) the car refers indirectly to the
concept of driving introduced before.
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(9) We drove [antecedent] to Frankfurt yesterday. The car [associative ana-
phor], however, was a bit too small.
In FrameNet terms, drive evokes in (9) the Operate_vehicle frame provid-
ing vehicle as one of its core elements. By virtue of frame-to-frame rela-
tions, the Operate_vehicle frame imposes a particular perspective on the re-
lated Use_vehicle frame. Hence, the associative anaphor the car speciVes one
particular FE of the frame evoked by the antecedent. In (9) associative anaphoric
reference succeeds because vehicle is not overtly realized in the Vrst sentence.
Given the local context provided in (9), the so-called “deVnite null instantiation”
(cf. Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 24) of the FE vehicle is instantly accessible.
More generally, one can conclude that a FrameNet approach to associative
anaphora supports the assumption that an associative anaphor is anchored in
the frame evoked by the antecedent in such a way that it conceptually speciVes
one of the FEs provided by the antecedent frame. This also holds for cases such as
(4) mentioned above:
(4) The search lingers on, but the key remains lost.
Unlike (9), the antecedent the search is a deverbal noun. However, both the
deverbal noun the search as well as the verb search evoke the Scrutiny frame.
Thus, the frame associated with the verb and the deverbal noun provides the same
FEs, among them the core FE Phenomenon (that is, in traditional case grammar
terms, the semantic role “object”). In (4) it is precisely this FE that is further
speciVed by the associative anaphor the key.
As mentioned above, beyond verbs and deverbal nouns also sortal nouns sur-
face as AAs. For example, in (7) pane is interpreted as a speciVcation of the FE
Descriptor inherent in the Buildings frame evoked by house. Sortal nouns like
house challenge the FrameNet approach in numerous respects, since such nouns
are characterized as words that “typically serve as dependents rather than clearly
evoking their own frame” (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 5). Although artifact and
natural kind nouns have “a minimal frame structure on their own”, it is nonethe-
less hard to see how analyses within a FrameNet approach can fully take account
of this subclass of AAs.
Note that FrameNet does not systematically diUerentiate between diUerent
types of concepts. Unlike the approach to associative anaphora introduced in
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Section 3, relational, functional, sortal, and individual concepts are distinguished
from one another only in terms of their varying valency pattern. As a result,
a FrameNet approach to associative anaphora is not able to support the strong
hypothesis that deVnite associative anaphors and functional concepts share the
constitutive properties of relationality and uniqueness of reference. I consider this
a methodological drawback, since the property of functionality correctly predicts
uniqueness of anaphoric reference in the case of deVnite associative anaphors. In
(4), for instance, the referent of the key is identiVed with the entity being searched
for.
As mentioned above, FrameNet cannot account for associative anaphors whose
antecedents surface as sortal nouns since they lack valency. It is worthwhile
noting, however, that this does not apply to all cases. Even though in (10), for
example, soup is a sortal noun, FrameNet does provide an explanation for the
associative-anaphoric reference triggered by spoon.
(10) When the waiter served the soup, he noticed that he had forgotten the
spoon.
In contrast to prototypical instances of DAAs with sortal nouns as antecedents,
as evidenced in (1), (2), and (5), a distinguishing feature of (10) is that the anaphor
and its antecedent are mediated by the inferred Ingestion frame, in which the
soup concept speciVes the FE Ingestibles while the spoon concept speciVes the
FE Instrument. In (10) it becomes apparent why it is useful to distinguish be-
tween frame invocation and evocation (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 15 f.) – a dis-
tinction that is missing in Barsalou’s approach. The associative anaphor spoon
is related to its antecedent soup by the invoked Ingestion frame. In the case of
frame invocation, a FrameNet approach to associative anaphora correctly predicts
that both anaphor and antecedent specify FEs (here: Ingestibles, Instrument)
of the invoked frame.
While, however, instances such as (10) constitute a sub-class of deVnite DAAs
with antecedents surfacing as sortal nouns, other DAAs with sortal nouns as
antecendents cannot be explained within the framework provided by FrameNet.
Yet, in turn, FrameNet allows for concise analyses of deVnite associative anaphors
with verbs and deverbal nouns as antecedents. As shown above, these classes of
DAAs cause serious problems for Barsalou’s approach to frames.
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Can a FrameNet approach to associative anaphora account for recursive ana-
phor-antecedent structures? Although neither Fillmore himself nor his collab-
orators seem to consider recursivity a property of semantic frames, there is no
fundamental caveat to integrating recursivity into frame-semantic investigations
of associative anaphors. Like in (11), an associative anaphor (the car) may be
followed by a subsequent sub-associative anaphor (the owner) thereby forming
a chain of indirect textual references that expresses relations between discourse
referents in a network structure.
(11) Today, Peter drove back home. He borrowed the car from a friend. The
owner, however, was Fred.
The NP the car is embedded in a recursive frame structure in such a way that
it speciVes the FE Vehicle of the Operate_vehicle frame evoked by drive, and at
the same time it evokes the Vehicle frame whose FE Possessor is speciVed by
the associative anaphor owner.
5 Conclusions
To sum up, Barsalou’s approach to frames diUers from FrameNet in a number of
respects. Most importantly, Barsalou envisages a cognitive theory of knowledge
representation in which frames are addressed as a universal mental representa-
tion format. Moreover, Barsalou’s theory is based on empirical evidence in the
Veld of cognitive psychology. On these grounds, Barsalou deVnes frames as re-
cursive attribute-value structures. FrameNet, on the other hand, is a genuine
linguistic project in that it is both grounded in an extended model of semantic as
well as syntactic valency and realized as a large-scale corpus project. Accordingly,
frames are not – at least not Vrst and foremost – deVned in cognitive terms but in
accordance with the annotation categories: on the basis of annotated data FEs and
frame-to-frame-relations are identiVed, and on the basis of these data core FEs are
distinguished from peripheral FEs. Although in FrameNet recursivity is not sup-
posed to be a deVning feature of frames, each so-called “frame deVnition” made
available for each annotated frame comprises a set of attested frame-to-frame
relations (cf. also Fillmore et al., 2003, pp. 304-313). Hence, frames are intercon-
nected with one another, albeit in a much more restrictive way than in Barsalou’s
approach which hypothesizes that each frame element (attribute, value) is re-
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cursive in nature. Table 2 summarizes the most important commonalities and
diUerences of both approaches to cognitive frames.
Table 2: Commonalities and differences of Barsalou’s and FrameNet’s approach to frames
Barsalou’s approach to frames FrameNet
Theory-
oriented
aspects
- cognitive theory of mental repre-
sentation
- linguistic theory based on seman-
tic and syntactic valency
- focus on sortal nouns - focus on verbs and deverbal nouns
- compatible with concept type the-
ory
[unspecified and not integrable]
Methodology - partly data-driven, partly introspec-
tion
- data-driven, bottom-up investiga-
tions by rich semantic annotations
Frame
structure
- distinction between attributes and
values
- distinction of peripheral and core
frame elements
- recursivity [unspecified but integrable]
[unspecified and impossible] - distinction between types of frame
relations
Application of
frames in the
domain of AA
- focus on relational and functional
nouns
- focus on deverbal nouns and verbs
[unspecified but integrable] - distinction between frame evoca-
tion and invocation
- integration of relational/functional
concepts and theory of determina-
tion
- integration of relational concepts
- focus on nominal antecedents - focus on verbal antecedents
What are the beneVts of a FrameNet and a Barsalou-inspired approach to as-
sociative anaphora? In contrast to the latter, FrameNet allows for explaining
anaphors with antecedents surfacing as verbs and deverbal nouns. Given the
analysis above, investigations of associative anaphors provide insights into the
composition of frames evoked by verbs and deverbal nouns on the text level, since
associative anaphors specify FEs of the frame evoked by the anchor frame ele-
ment. Subsequently, new FEs may be deVned on the basis of annotated anaphors,
and lexical entries provided by FrameNet may be supplemented accordingly. Note
also that each associative anaphor establishes a speciVc semantic relation to its
antecedent and thus oUers linguistic evidence for frame-to-frame-relations. Com-
position and inheritance, as described by Fillmore & Baker (2001), are ubiquitous
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relation types but besides the frame-to-frame relations identiVed by FrameNet
many more seem to be relevant to resolve associative anaphors (cf. Kleiber,
2001; Greber, 1993). To this end, an interesting issue for future research would
be whether attested relations are item-speciVc or rather stable across exemplars
within a domain.
A fundamental caveat of a FrameNet approach to associative anaphors con-
cerns the exclusion of sortal nouns as frame-evoking lexical units (Ruppenhofer
et al., 2010, p. 5). In turn, Barsalou has developed his frame theory on the ba-
sis of sortal concept. However, he does not seem to be aware of the limitations
involved in this approach; at least the reader is left wanting some reWections on
the linguistic nature of the analyzed concepts. In Löbner (1998) and within the re-
search projects SFB 991 and FOR 600, Barsalou’s frame theory is supplemented by
Löbner’s concept type theory, yielding a substantial theoretical extension in that
attributes are equated with functional nouns. Nonetheless the extended Barsalou
approach still focuses on nominal concepts. A full-Wedged frame theory of verb
frames based on Barsalou’s approach has not yet been developed.
Apart from sortal concepts also individual and relational concepts are inte-
grated in Barsalou’s frame theory, namely in such way that sortal, relational, and
individual concepts may constitute frame attributes if they are shifted, or coerced,
to functional concepts due to linguistic cues such as deVnitness markers (cf. Löb-
ner, 2011). At this point, however, the empirical issue arises whether it is useful
to principally restrict frame attributes to the set of functional concepts. IAAs, as
exempliVed in (2), prototypically surface as relational nouns (e. g., window), and
due to the property of indeVniteness, they are not object of a conceptual shift.
But, then, are there empirical reasons for the assumption that they do not Vgure
as attributes in the frame evoked by the antecedent? In the case of DAAs, on the
other hand, equating attributes with functional concepts helps to explain the cog-
nitive mechanism underlying anaphora resolution: Since DAAs are interpreted
as functional concepts in context, their possible referents are restricted to only
one referent. In this respect, a FrameNet approach to DAA does not provide a
suitable account of DAA resolution; at the same time, no principal problems arise
in the domain of IAAs. A more comprehensive theory of AA based on Barsalou
frames has to address the following research issues: To what extent and under
which conditions do head nouns of DAAs call for type shifts in order to motivate
a functional interpretation of the nouns in question?
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To conclude, FrameNet and Barsalou’s approach complement each other in
such a way that the latter concentrates on sortal concepts functioning as frame-
evoking elements, while FrameNet focuses on relational concepts, particularly
verbs and deverbal nouns. Barsalou disregards semantic and syntactic valences
of each frame-evoking word, whereas valency provides the very basis for the
FrameNet methodology. This Vnding gives rise to issues of the following kind:
How can FrameNet account for sortal nouns serving as associative anaphors?
And how can, in turn, Barsalou’s approach account for verbs serving as associa-
tive anaphors? What’s the theoretical status of sortal nouns within FrameNet, and
in what respect do verb frames diUer from noun frames in Barsalou’s approach?
More generally, which linguistic elements evoke frames in each approach? It is
beyond the scope of this article to provide answers to these questions. However,
as I hope to have shown, there are several complementary research aspects of
FrameNet and Barsalou’s approach to frames and its extensions within FOR 600
and SFB 991. The diverging viewpoints and starting assumptions stimulate each
other, pointing to a more comprehensive frame theory.
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